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GOVER·NMENTA·L RESPO.NSIBILITY
FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Frederick C. Irion
~ THEORY BEHIND the_Labo~Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-
~ Hartley Act), as expressed by its declaration of policy, is that industrial
strife can be avoided or substantially minimized if employers, employees,
and labor organizations each recognize one another's "legitimate rights"
and protect the public health, safety, and interest. The phrase "legitimate
rights" is nof'defined specifically in the Act." What then are the "legitimate
rights" ,of management, labor, and the public in their relations with each
other?'
The rights referred to obviously are not based primarily on Jefferson's
concept that governments are instituted among men to secure life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness. ,Other matters were under consideration on
June 23, 1947, when Congress enacted the Labor Management Relations
Act over the President's veto. Glib generalizations about the Act, such as
labeling it the ,"slave labor act" or the "bill of rights for individual em-
ployees," are of little value.
The LMRA of '1947, while sharply focusing public attention on the
problem of labor-management relations, changed. many of the rules under
which collectiye bargaining is conducted but did not challenge collective
bargaining as a principle. This perhaps is surprising since collective
bargaining, despite certain excellent features, may be a threat to the con-
tinuation of democratic institutions in the United States. In all, government
seems to have shirked its responsibility for collective bargaining.
American legislation has many characteristics and can be classified in
many ways (as Ernst Freund and others have demonstrated). For the pur-
pose of this artide, however, two basic patterns can be distinguished: first,
government sets standards or, second, government serves~ as a referee be-
tween conflicting interests.
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 is an example of the first type.
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For all covered employees, certain minimum wages are prescribed and over-
time pay is required for hours worked in excess of forty in any workweek.
,In the field of labor, setting of such standards is sometimes thought of as a
new policy; however, in the experience of Anglo-American' jurisprudence,
the regulation of pay and working conditions is very old. The only thing
new about modem legislation is that it aaempts to force;> high pay and
short working hours, whereas the reverse has been true' through most of
British and American history. Good pay and working conditions as goals
are a relatively recent development, since only within the last century or
,so has the "amelioration of humanity and not the coercion of the mentally
or physically weaker members of society . . . become the guiding principle
of legislation."1._
The National Labor Relations Act, as modified by the jLabor Manage-
ment Relations Act, is an example of the type of legislatiOn in which the
, government attempts to serve as a referee between conflicting interests.
There are certain assumptions at the very heart of this typ¢ of legislation:
(1) a capitalistic economic order is desirable, (2) government should have
but limited powers, and (3) the public good is achieved through clashing
interests due to the fact that although the individual intends only his own
gain, he is "led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part
, "I
of his intention." 2 . ,
The referee type of legislation is supported by, MadisQn's proposition,
stated in The Federalist, that various and unequal distribution of property
always has caused factions and that the regulation of various and interfering
interests forms the principal task of legislation. So basic has this thinking
become that high school students in New York State, for example, are. taught
in a particular course that the role of government is that of being the re,feree
of private interes~ and conflicting claims.s
The success or failure of referee legislation depends Qn the reality sit-
uation, not theory. At the present time, do clashing interests in the labor-
management field tend to promote the public welfare? j
I
The. formal basis of collective bargaining is somewh~t Is follows: if
labor and management can be brought together to talk over their problems,
it will be found that mutuality of interests outweighs confliCting viewpoints;
agreement, therefore, will result from conferences; and disdgreement, ~trikes
and lockouts for instance, will result only because of th~ faulty· appraisal
of the situation based on an inadequate understanding of each other's posi-
i
1 Edward Channing, "An Historical Retrospect," American Historkal Review, vol. 26,
no. 2. p. 196 Oanuary. 1921) • •
2 Adam Smith. The Wealth of Nations, Book 4, Chapt. 2 (1925 ed., Methuen So: Co.•
London, p. 421) •
8 New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Industrial and La1;>or Conditions. The
A.merican Story of Industrial and Labor Relations (Albany, 1943) • pp. ~294·296.
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~ons. Thus, in the long run, a maximum of good. results from collective
'bargaining. ,-
The formal theory of collective· bargaining is in turn rooted in another
theory: only' through increased production can either management or labor
make any real gains in their economic positions. This, in the, capitalistic
view, is so.obvious that no discussion is necessary.
Reasoning in a circular fashion from the premise that increased pro-
duction is the only way for management and labor to prosper, the basic
premises (developed in the first section of this article) are reinforced, for
(1) capitalism is presumed to have proved itself the most effective system
f6r achieving 'production, (~) a government of limited powers insures the
necessary freedom to capitalism, and '(3) apparently clashing interests fos-
tered by competition in actuality lead to the 'most satisfactory type of
agreement. A serious defect, howev~r, exists in this analysis. Increased pro-
duction does not lead necessarily to a more profitable economic situation
for both management and labor, for either management or labor may try
to gobble up all the increase and even attempt to encroach on what the
other ,has received already. '
The -fiasco that was The President's National Labor-Management
Conference of November 5-30, 1945, illustrates the views of tabor and man-
agement concerning increased production. Labor statements showed that
labor was determined to gain for itself all increaSed production and cut
into management's established mar~ of profit; management statements
showed that management was determined to gain for itself all increased
production and, by a "realistlC*' wage policy, secUre a foothold in labor's
established position. It is little wonder that platitudes, the only result of •
the Conference, were followed 'by one of the most fratricidal periods of
American history.
The strikes and loc;:kouts were not due to a misunderstanding of in-
terests. Management, since the conclusion of World War II, has been
obsessed with the idea of increasing its margin of profit; on the other hand,
labor has been obsessed with the idea of getting an increased share of pro-
duction. In some disputes, it has been clear that management would be
satisfied with nothing less than forcing labor"s wages to a subsistence level; . -
in other disputes, it has been clear that labor would be satisfied· only if
management~sprofits were zero or if operations were conducted at aloss.
R. H. Tawney'sgloomtpredictions in The"Acquisitive Society seem to
be coming to pass. Tawney held that where the few own most of the prop-
erty, the country will be governed for the advantage of the few and only
incidentally or by accident for the benefit of the many. He further held
that such a situation makes industrial warfare inevitable. He ridiculed the
idea that industrial peace can be secured merely by an exercise of tact and
3
Irion: Government Responsibility for Collective Bargaining
Published by UNM Digital Repository, 1948
52 NEW MEXICO QUARTERLY REVIEW
forbearance based on a supposed identity of interests between capital and 'A
labor, since the disputes which matter are" not caused by ai misunderstand- '."
ing of identity of interests but by a better understanding of diversity of
interests.
Certain hard facts stand out as a result of consideration of this phase
of collective bargaining. .First, collective bargaining based on diversity of
interests can result in class warfare. This seems to be the stage in which
collective bargaining now exists. Second, the public as a whole (which in-
_ cludes management and labor) benefits by increased production and is
harmed by decreased production, regardless of the disposition of production
to various groups. Third, governmental recognition of collettive bargaining,
through the NLRA of 1935 and the LMRA of 1947, is an a:ttempt to avoid
responsibility for allocating production among the various groups constitut-
ing the total population.
Formal assumptions concerning collective bargaining seem to have had
little effect on its record, since the actual practice of collective bargaining
is far removed from recognition of mutuality of interests ofvarious groups.
Yet, at least one unforeseen consequence of collective bargaining presents
it in a better light.
In the modem world, freedom of contract,so dear tb the hear~ of
property owners, has but little meaning for the working !man. It seems
probable that if the working man should be forced to make a~choicebetween
freedom of contract and freedom from want, he would sacdfice freedom of
contract on the altar of a full stomach. Such an occurrence doubtless would
be a death blow for capitalism. However, if the wo~kingmad had a re~l and
substantial interest in freedom of contract, it is unlikely thai he would give
up this right lightly. ~
The Nation~ Labor Relations Act of 1935 apparently was successful
to some degree in extending freedom of contract to labor~ The working
man, under the NLRA, had a bargaining position somewhat equivalent tp
that of management. It is too early to tell what effect the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947 will have on labor's participation in freedom
of contract. In all, it is clear that to the extent that colleq:ive bargaining
makes the working man a partner with management in a 'd~sire to preserve
freedom of contract, collective bargaining acts as a stabilizin$' feature in our
government.
. \
Management, through Its constant attack on the NLRA of 1935, showed
that it had little use for equality in bargaining. F~w in manrgement agreed
with William Allen White's opinion, expressed in The Cha~gingWest, that
the collective bargaining power of labor must be firmly e~ablished, since
only in this manner can labor gain self-respect.
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Labor, with the possible exception of certain of its leaders, was unaware ~
of the fact that it was participating in----freedom of contract. More money in
the pay envelope, shorter hours and better working conditions - these _were
what the goals of the NLRA of 1935 were to the wage earner.
Perhaps both management and labor were correct in ignoring the view
that under the NLRA of 1935 both had freedom of contract. Perhaps the
attitude of each, that the purpose of the NLRA of 1935 was to promote a
struggle in which labor could get a hvger share of the production pie, was
correct. .
If Congress had so desired, it could have evolved a much more e1aborate
Fair Labor Standards Act than was actually achieved. Rate ranges for vari·
ous job classifications could have been established. Conditions for work
could have been established. Ali almost infinite variety' ot standards' could
have been created (and since the conclusion of World War II, the experi-
ence gained from the National W:r Labor Board could have been effe.ctively
utilized).
What Congress actually did was enact the National Labor Relations
Act in 1935, which recognized the ·situation in which labor and management
"legally" could settle their issues by force, and adopt the Fair Labor Stan-
..
dards Act in 1938, which removed certain areas from the field of combat.
For the weak (that is, those who had insufficient stre~gth or declined t?
use force), the NLRA offered no aid, but the FLSA provided a thirty and
eventually forty-cent an hour minimum wage.
The War caused a temporary halt in the labor-management conflict.
This gave weay to a period in which the struggle was renewed with added
vigor. While both labor and management are losing huge sums through
work stoppages and other conditions cominon to labor disputes, the public
is losing production.
Rather than have a continuation of the present situation, a cynic might
suggest that it would be much more sensible if Congress provided that both
management and labor stay at work and that disputes be settled through
the payment of sums. to the Treasury, with the winner being the party pay-
ing the largest s~m. The refinement~of a point system, if so de~ired, could
be established to determine exactly the nature of the employment contract
resulting from each dispute. .
A cynic might also note that Americans as a rule think it uproariously
funny that certain Northwest Coast Indians settle their disputes by "com-
petitive destruction of various types of goods which, in certain instances,
may reduce particular tribes to poverty. Yet the same American public looks
on collective bargaining, which is but another form of the Indians' podatch,
as an intelligent manner of settling disputes.
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".
In all, collective bargaining is indeed a strange doctrine. For centuries,
a substantial portion of Anglo-American jurisprudence has been devoted
to attempting- to eliminate force as a method for settlingwtutes.And here
in the twentieth century not only is an adaptation of tri~rby-combat legal-
ized but encouraged. ..
All too frequently the guiding principle of legislation regarding labor-
management relations has been the degree of desire to help management ~
or labor. Such a sentimental basis for action possibly can result in the de-
struction of our democracy, since good or poor legislation then becomes the
result of chance.
;,
Collective bargaining seems to have been accepted generally as a sound
basis for the settlement of labor-management problems. This attitude, ap-
parently, results from American faith in discussion as a method of settling
conflicts and from a belief· that governmental regulation of the private
economy should be at a minimum. Behind this is the concept that all ele-
ments of society have a mutuality of interest which excludes fundamental
antipathies.
Where labor is determined to secure all benefits of production for itself
. without consideration for the position of management a.J?d where manage-
ment wants everything for itself without thought for l~bor, fundamental
I
differences exist which cannot be settled by talk. This offefs at least a partial
explanation for the. bitter labor-management struggle following World
War II.
Where basic conflicts exist which cannot be settled at the discussion
table, legislation recognizing collective bargaining and utilizing it as a
method of dealing with labor-management problems may result in an in-
crease in industrial strife and, if the division between the two groups is
driven deep enough, produce the very class warfare which Marx predicted
would destroy the capitalistic countries.
If essential and irreconcilable differences have developed between man-
agement and labor, Congress is faced with three choices:
.First. Congress may let matters drift. Whether the legislation con~
cerning collective bargaining favors labor (as in the NLRA of 1935) or
management (as in the LMRA of 1947) makes lij:t1e difference, for class
conflict will exist to a serious degree.
Second. Congress could set standards for the field of labor management
relations to the degree necessary to eliminate class }Varfare.
Third. Congress could determine new procedures which would elimin-
ate force as a method for settling disputes. However, if government should
be established as the final arbitrator of disputes which could not be settled
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otherwise, it in effect would be setting ,standards, although not directly by
legislation. Ii "'•
. There will be difficulties whichever choice is taken. On theane hand,
an incorrect positive program could cause havoc; on the other hand, how-
ever, a do-nothing policy could be just as destructive.
Although government may wish that management and labor could settle
their disputes by themselves, the facts indicate that government must assume
more and more resp0l1sibility for securing production if the public is to be
protected. Thus, collective bargaining has become the immediate respons-
ibility of government.
THROUG.H
BARGAINING
INDUSTRIAL PEACE
COLLECTIVE
Alervyn Crobaugh
W HAT IS STRANGE about collective bargaining is that anyone should con-sider it strange. .
. Unionism, as stated by noted economist Sumner H. Slichter, is a
"method of introducing civil rights into industry, that is, of requiring that
management be conducted by rule rather than by arbitrary decisions.'~ Col-
lective bargaining is. another method of democratizing industrial relations.'
The alternative to the collective contract is to let business dictate the
terms and conditions of employment, since the individual cannot stand up
against the bargaining power of the modern corporation. Bargaining
between a group of employees and a corporation brings equality .in the con-
tractual relationship. In the dominant fields of American industrial rela-
tions, it is unsound and unrealistic to expect a private individual to be able
to contra;ct ef{ectively :without the aid of a union. .
The government in recognizing and encouraging collective bargaining
-is not legalizing industrial combat ~ny more than it has legalized in,dividual
strife by developing rules and regulations governing the individual contract.
It is in an arena of immature collective bargaining that industrial strife
takes place. _
Collective bargaining is not to be construed as a system of tolerated
limited warfare. It ~ as much a :method of setting labor standards as a
procedure for working out the detalls of labor contracts. Government is not
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